CRISIS, WHAT CRISIS ?*

* Yes, you’re right, Supertramp, 1975 

In the current highly complex context for Western democracies, confronted with the rise of populism and a growing distrust of politics, institutions, and the system, the events of recent weeks in France (and to a lesser extent in other European countries) are, I believe, merely a symptom of a much more fundamental and profound problem. It reminds me of the excellent film "Don't Look Up," which highlighted the denial of climate-skeptic elites. Today, we can describe the attitude of these elites and a segment of the middle class that considers itself protected as "system-skeptical." Indeed, we are facing a multi-layered societal crisis, all of which are closely interconnected, that I list with no order of importance below :

• An environmental crisis

• A societal crisis with:

o a deterioration of public services, particularly Education and Healthcare

o looming generational conflicts

o a crisis in the transmission of values

o a loss of confidence in the functioning of society and its institutions

o a retreat into isolationism and a loss of common sense (See “The Age of the Tyrant Individual”)

• A looming crisis of capitalism, which exacerbates the widening of inequalities, with a headlong rush blind to the lack of planetary resources needed to maintain “deified growth,” and debt that continues to balloon and will not be eliminated simply by the return of inflation. The unequal and widening distribution of the added value of our economies between labor and capital, with a sharp increase in poverty and a shrinking middle class, without which this economic system will not be sustainable in the medium term.

• A political crisis characterized by distrust of elected officials across the spectrum and public disengagement from the political sphere (see the evolution of voter turnout rates).

• A geopolitical crisis, stemming from the greed and the need to divert public attention from domestic problems of the autocrats currently governing the United States and Russia, not to mention China, which is playing a more discreet game at the moment, but with the same disdain for international institutions and the rule of law.

• Finally, a crisis in the sharing of reality. This is yet another recurring theme, with social media manipulating tailor-made truths that further divide society and, above all, spread the virus of ignorance.

In short, the situation is, of course, anxiety-inducing. At the same time, the elites and the segment of the Western population living in abundance are ignoring the real problems. I see posts from acquaintances on social media focusing on the symptoms, pointing the finger at scapegoats (the French rioters are immigrants, the welfare state has emptied the coffers, etc.) and continuing to live as if these crises only affect them remotely.

We're not going to debate here and now which crisis should be tackled first, because, although they are all interconnected, their severity may vary from country to country. One thing, however, is certain. If the elites don't open their eyes and agree to start working on solutions, to lead by example, to take matters into their own hands, but instead content themselves with the current status quo, hoping either to be preserved by a right-wing populist takeover or, ultimately, to be able to flee with their savings in the face of the "angry masses," the system will remain in suicidal mode until it implodes. Or else we will be subjected to authoritarian regimes that reinforce current divisions and inequalities by suppressing fundamental freedoms.

To begin exploring potential solutions, the most important thing is to fully understand the situation. In May 2025, I published excerpts and a summary of a fascinating book, "END TIMES, Elites, Couter-Elites and the Path to Political Disintegration" by Peter Tuchlin, that I strongly recommend to you. At the time, this blog had around fifty members, a number that has since tripled (THANK YOU!!!), and many of you probably didn't see that post back then. Tuchlin and his team's thesis is based on extensive historical research. I'll let you discover the main points below. The study focuses primarily on the United States, but you'll see that the situations are similar in all Western democracies.

END TIMES,  Elites, Counter-Elites and the Path of Political Disintegration by Peter Turchin (2023)

In contemporary countries like the United States or France, which benefit from both a strong state and an absence of genuine external enemies, the factors of chaos can be more or less limited to a deadly tango involving increasingly quarrelsome elites and increasingly powerless masses—a situation from which the “counter-elites” will draw the resources to overthrow the existing power structure.

All chaotic eras are preceded by a rise in intra-elite conflicts, and what we are experiencing today is no exception. In the past, intra-elite conflicts were waged more brutally—through duels or bloody street brawls. The author suggests that we should consider ourselves fortunate that, instead of physical assassination, those aspiring to elite status now practice reputational assassination.

Turchin and his colleagues created a thriving field of research, cliodynamics (from Clio, the muse of history in Greek mythology, and dynamics, the science of change). This allowed them to discover the existence of major recurring patterns observable throughout human history, going back ten thousand years. From the outset, they focused on cycles of political integration and disintegration, particularly the formation and collapse of states. Through quantitative historical analysis, they were able to observe how complex societies everywhere are affected by recurring and, to some extent, predictable waves of political instability, caused by the same range of fundamental forces at work for millennia of human history.

The model states that when a state, such as the United States, experiences stagnant or declining real wages, a growing gap between rich and poor, an overproduction of highly educated young people, a decline in general confidence and an explosion of public debt, these seemingly disparate social indicators are in fact dynamically linked to each other.

Cliodynamics leverages the methods of data science, understanding historical sources compiled by generations of historians, such as big data. It uses mathematical models to map the network of interactions between the various "moving parts" of the complex social systems that constitute our societies. Cliodynamics respects the scientific method, ensuring that alternative theories are subjected to empirical and factual testing.

What does cliodynamics teach us about the difficult times we are currently experiencing? 

It turns out that since the emergence of the first complex societies organized into states—five thousand years ago—even though they may experience considerable success for a time, all eventually encounter problems. All complex societies go through cycles alternating periods of peace and harmony interspersed with outbreaks of war and discord.

What the author aims to explain is how impersonal social forces push societies to the brink of collapse and beyond. He cites examples from human history, but his primary objective is to explain how we slipped into our current age of discord, focusing empirically on the United States. Since the crisis has deep historical roots, he traces the story back to the New Deal, when an unwritten social contract became part of American political culture. This informal and implicit contract balanced the interests of workers, business, and the State in a way similar to the more formal and explicit tripartite agreements of the Nordic countries. For two generations, this tacit pact enabled unprecedented growth in general well-being in America. At the same time, the "Great Compression" significantly reduced economic inequality. Although some people were excluded from this compact, notably Black Americans, overall and for a good half century, the interests of workers and property owners were kept in balance in the United States, so that overall income inequality remained remarkably low.

This social contract began to unravel in the late 1970s. As a result, workers' wages, which had previously kept pace with general economic growth, began to lag behind. Real wages stagnated and sometimes even declined. This led to a decline in the quality of life for most of the American population. The most striking trend was the stagnation and even decline in average life expectancy. And while workers' wages and incomes stagnated, the fruits of economic growth were reaped by the elites. A pernicious "wealth pump" was established, taking from the poor to give to the rich.

We are seeing exactly the same trend in France, as well as in many Western democracies…

As the authors' model predicts, the additional wealth trickling down to the elites (the so-called 1%, and even more so the top 0.01%) has ultimately harmed the holders of wealth (and power). We now have too many "future elites" vying for a limited number of places in the upper echelons of politics and business. In their model, they call this the "overproduction of elites." Combined with the impoverishment of the working classes, the overproduction of elites and the internal conflicts thus generated have gradually undermined their civic cohesion, the sense of national cooperation without which states quickly rot from within. This social fragility is increasingly evident in the collapse of trust in state institutions and the erosion of the social norms governing public discourse and the functioning of democratic institutions.

The central question of the book is that of social power. Who rules? How do ruling elites maintain their dominant position within society? Who challenges the status quo, and what role does the overproduction of elites play in the emergence of these challengers? And why do ruling classes, both past and present, sometimes suddenly lose their grip on power and are overthrown?

Elites, Their Overproduction, and the Road to Disaster

Elites are the individuals with the greatest social power—namely, the ability to influence others. A more descriptive term would be to refer to elites as "power holders."

In the United States, power is closely linked to wealth. Therefore, it is relatively easy to determine who belongs to the different strata of power holders. If you are American and your net worth is between $1 million and $2 million, you are among the richest 10%, which places you in the lower ranks of the American elite. This wealth gives them a great deal of control—power—over their own lives, and they are certainly far removed from poverty. The correlation between wealth and real power begins to tighten among those whose wealth is in the tens, or even better, hundreds, of millions of dollars, although the correlation between wealth and political power is not perfect. The fact remains that the 1% have a great deal of power over the lives of others. Moreover, the poor, once they gain power in the United States, do not remain poor for long. The close correlation between wealth and political power is explained by the fact that many politicians who start out poor, join the ranks of the wealthy after their terms in office. Conversely, very wealthy people at the grassroots level are much more likely to want and obtain an electoral mandate than ordinary mortals.

When it comes to social power, the hardest—and most brutal—form is coercion: the use of force or the threat of it. American experts in coercion, generals and senior police officers, are often subordinate to other forms of power. The second type of power is wealth. The third, more subtle, is bureaucratic or administrative power. Finally, the fourth, and softest, type of power is ideological—the power of persuasion, except that this “soft power” is actually an extremely powerful force, capable of moving multitudes. Not to mention that, most of the time, it is simply the power of social norms that makes us march in step.

From this, we understand that the answer to the question of who the elites are is not simple.

While not everyone has the ambition to acquire more power, there are always more aspirants than positions. Inevitably, some try to obtain one without succeeding – these are the frustrated aspirants to the elite. The overproduction of elites occurs when the demand for positions of power massively exceeds the supply. Starting in the 1980s, the number of super-rich individuals – worth at least $10 million – began to explode in the US. There were 66,000 in 1983, reaching 693,000 in 2019, rising from 0.08% to 0.54% of the population. A similar expansion in the wealth of the rich also occurred a little further down the food chain. While the number of ten-millionaires has increased tenfold, households worth $5 million or more have increased sevenfold, and the number of mere millionaires has quadrupled. At the same time, the income and wealth of the typical American family has been shrinking. This divergence between the financial health of ordinary Americans and that of the wealthy elite is the basis for the rapid increase in economic equality.

The second problem is much more subtle and rarely well understood: when the social pyramid becomes too top-heavy, the consequences are disastrous for the stability of societies. In this case, the number of positions of power has remained unchanged over the past few decades, but the number of frustrated aspirants has exploded even faster than the already impressive expansion of wealth holders.

Before the 1960s, relative wages had risen steadily, but once that decade passed, they began to plummet and, by 2010, had been almost halved. This era of stagnation and declining wages has affected not only economic indicators of well-being, but also biological and social indicators. The phenomenon breeds discontent, which eventually turns into anger. When popular discontent combines with an excess number of aspirants to the elite, the result is a highly flammable cocktail, as Americans have witnessed since 2016 and Trump's rise to power.

The grim conclusion is that Americans without a four-year college degree—64% of the total population—are faring worse in absolute terms; their real wages fell by nearly 30% in the forty years leading up to 2016.

Moreover, in biological terms, starting with children born in the 1960s, the height of Americans stopped increasing—a change that only affected the US. In other high-income democracies, average height has continued to rise, so much so that the world's tallest people now live in the Netherlands, Sweden, and Germany, but not in the United States. Similarly, a well-documented phenomenon is the decline in life expectancy at birth, which fell by 1.6 years in the US between 2020 and 2014 (!), largely due to the rising mortality rate among white, working-class men aged 45 to 55.

The deterioration of the economic conditions of the less educated has been accompanied by a decline in the social institutions that previously nourished their social life and cooperation. These institutions include the family, the Church, trade unions, public schools and their parent-teacher associations, as well as various neighborhood volunteer organizations. The gradual breakdown of social ties is also of vital importance.

By 2016, the American population had thus divided into two social classes: the educated and the poor—à la Victor Hugo. Except that these are not classes, by Marx's standard, because they are not defined by their relationship to the means of production. And neither is a coherent actor in the political arena. The less educated "poor," in particular, are deeply divided by race. Conversely, these two groups are sharply distinguished by a whole range of characteristics: psychological (higher or lower levels of "extreme distress"), social (lower or higher marriage rates), political (tendency to vote Republican or Democrat), economic (declining or rising economic prospects), and, perhaps most tragically, biological (declining or rising life expectancy). Finally, the class divide has never been harder to bridge due to the soaring costs of higher education.

The decline in the well-being of the working class undermines the very foundations of a society's stability, with the falling standard of living of a large portion of the population undermining the legitimacy of institutions and thus weakening the state.

The author then draws a very comprehensive and interesting parallel between the United States of the 1850s and that of 2020, with an explosion of inequality and an overproduction of elites.

Lessons from History

All complex human societies, as long as they are organized into states, experience recurring waves of political instability. In their most common form, they manifest themselves through alternating phases of integration and disintegration, lasting roughly a century. Internal peace, social stability, and relatively cooperative elites characterize phases of integration. Phases of disintegration are their antithesis: social instability, elite dislocation, and sustained outbreaks of political violence.

The work of Turchin and his team highlights four structural factors of instability: the impoverishment of the working classes, which provides a potential for mass mobilization; the overproduction of elites, which leads to intra-elite conflict; poor fiscal health and a weakening of state legitimacy; and, finally, geopolitical factors. Intra-elite competition and conflict are the most crucial factor, a reliable indicator of imminent crisis. The other criteria are generally present, but their effect is not universal. For example, for large and powerful empires, the importance of geopolitical factors is usually secondary. Typically, such systems are far too large to be affected by what their neighbors do, and their social collapse is driven by internal forces.

Today, one might wonder whether "hybrid" wars waged through disinformation contradict this latter thesis…

Overproduction of Elites

Today, a higher education degree is by no means a perfect, or even reasonably effective, vaccine against precariousness. History teaches us that the educated precariat is the most dangerous class for social stability. An overproduction of young graduates has been the most significant factor in societal upheavals, from the revolutions of 1848 to the Arab Spring of 2011. A near-universal characteristic of pre-crisis phases is the fragmentation of the ideological landscape and the disintegration of the elite's ideological consensus, the basis of the general consensus enjoyed by state institutions. Another general characteristic is that ideologies of division—sectarian and identity-based—take precedence over ideologies of unity, resulting in periods of discord.

American Plutocracy

Compared to other Western democracies, the degree of influence economic elites have over government in the US is quite unusual. In countries like Denmark or Austria, the ruling classes are adept at listening to their populations. While power in Western European democracies has occasionally shifted to the center-right, the consensus in favor of the welfare state remained strong among the ruling elites. Similarly, until recently, these countries have largely resisted the global trend of rising economic inequality. This book, dating from 2023, shows an acceleration in many European countries of the same trends, whether in terms of the explosion of inequalities or the future prospects of a youth, educated or not.

From an outside perspective, one might be impressed by how meticulously the inhabitants of the world's most powerful nation have managed to sabotage their society. Despite remarkable scientific progress, extraordinary technological advancement, and impressive economic growth, the well-being of most Americans has deteriorated. And even among the winners, many believe they are incapable of passing on their success to their offspring and are left unable to sleep at night.

What we tend to forget is that even if democratic institutions are the best (or least worst) way to govern societies, democracies are particularly vulnerable to plutocratic subversion. Ideology may be the softest and most flaccid form of power, but in democratic societies, it is essential. Plutocrats have the means to use their wealth to buy media outlets, fund think tanks, and lavishly reward social influencers who promote their messages. In other words, they wield enormous power to sway the electorate toward opinions that favor their interests.

The author and his colleagues have developed a model to predict possible scenarios, the most likely of which is a continued disintegration of the US social system, resulting in a major internal conflict within the country, not excluding the possibility of civil war.

Conclusion

Humanity has come a long way since our species first emerged some 200,000 years ago. The last 10,000 years have been marked by particularly rapid evolution. Despotic elites oppressing ordinary people have arisen repeatedly and been overthrown just as often. We are once again in the disintegration phase of this cycle, but as we live through our own Age of Discord, it is worth remembering that humanity has learned from previous debacles. Cumulative cultural evolution has equipped us with remarkable technologies, including social technologies—institutions—that enable our societies to provide their inhabitants with an unprecedented—and fairly widespread—quality of life. Of course, perfection has not yet been achieved—there are vast differences between countries in the well-being of their populations. But in the long run, these variations are necessary for continued cultural evolution. If societies don't experiment with better social arrangements, then evolution will stop. More importantly, when the selfishness of elites is leading their societies to ruin, it's good to have alternatives—success stories to look up to. And it's up to the "99%" to demand that our leaders act in ways that promote our common interests. Human societies need elites—managers, administrators, opinion leaders—to function well. The goal isn't to get rid of them, but to ensure that they act in the interests of all... »

PS: I know what you're going to say… Your little piece of paper is all well and good, but now what? My immediate answer is : we start by voting pragmatically, not with our emotions, not out of spite, not because we need someone to make us dream… As for the rest, we all probably have ideas, and "be my guest," keep the debate going! These are issues that will only be resolved over time, but we all need to find ways to get involved. See you soon!